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Abstract Several studies provide evidence that judgments on punishment are
influenced by variables that are more or less independent of guilt considerations. It
is postulated that these so called extralegal variables, such as the victim’s reputation
or outcome severity that occurs accidentally and without intention by the offender,
in particular influence judgments that are made under restricted cognitive capacity
(low processing depth). Two studies, using a vignette methodology, explore whether
participants are able to correct the biasing influences of extralegal variables if they
are motivated to elaborate their judgments under the most optimal conditions (high
processing depth). Study 1 investigates the influence of victim’s reputation, and
Study 2 the combined influence of victim’s reputation and accidentally occurring
outcome severity under either low or high depth of information processing. Results
show that the influence of extralegal variables can be corrected. However, correc-
tions are either limited or excessive, and are sometimes even inappropriate.
Keywords Automatic judgment  Punishment  Extralegal variables  Bias
correction  Overcorrection  Severity effect  Reputation of victim
Lay people’s judgments about punishment are often biased. They are, for example,
guided by a so called ‘‘severity effect’’ (Robbennolt, 2006), meaning that
punishment is influenced by the severity of the outcome of an accident or an
offense without sufficient considerations as to whether or not the culprit is
responsible for it. Although classical theories of moral reasoning (Heider, 1958;
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Kohlberg, 1969; Malle, 2006; Piaget, 1965; Shaver 1985; Weiner, 1995) presuppose
that lay people normally distinguish effects that are produced intentionally from
those that are unintended, and that their punishment is guided by considerations of
culpability, such as intention and controllability by the actor, numerous studies over
the last decade are challenging this view. These studies demonstrate that the amount
of damage or injury resulting from a violation of norms influences the severity of
punishment that is advocated even if the defendant caused the damage only
indirectly (Greene & Darley, 1998), or if at least some portion of the total damage/
injury was neither intended, nor could have been anticipated (Rucker, Polifroni,
Tetlock, & Scott, 2004), or if its occurrence or non-occurrence was mainly
accidental (Oswald, Orth, Aeberhard, & Schneider, 2005).
Lay people’s judgments about punishment are, however, also biased by the
influence of several other variables, such as the reputation of the victim, even if the
offender could not have had any knowledge of this reputation (Mazzocco, Alicke, &
Davis, 2004), the offender’s ethnicity (ForsterLee, ForsterLee, Horowitz, & King,
2006; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000, 2001), his or her gender (Rodriguez, Curry, &
Lee, 2006) and attractiveness (Stewart, 1980; Zebrowitz, & McDonald, 1991). Such
systematic influences have also been called ‘‘extralegal’’ since they put either the
victim or the defendant at a disadvantage, and because they violate legal rules or
ethical principles (cf. Vidmar, 2002).
Fair and just decisions about the punishment of an offender are central aims not
only of the criminal court, and of penal legislation, but also of society in general (cf.
De Keijser & Elffers, 2009). In order to improve decisions about punishment, it is,
therefore, an important question as to whether, and under what conditions, people
avoid biases, or are willing and able to correct their judgments. The research on
correction of judgmental biases has been influenced crucially by Devine’s (1989)
observation that, in the intergroup context, prejudices and stereotyping occur
automatically, and may be corrected only afterwards. Subsequently, there has been a
vivid debate about the conditions and mechanisms of correction of judgmental
biases, concerning both the inhibition of automatic processing and the correction of
automatically triggered biases (for an overview cf. Bodenhausen, Todd, &
Richeson, 2009).
Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, and Chamberlin (2002) were able to show
that participants’ motivation to elaborate on automatically generated moral
judgments varies with their value orientations. They refer to the often demonstrated
result that liberally oriented individuals tend to attribute the problematic behavior of
other persons (e.g., crime, poverty, and diseases for which the person is herself or
himself responsible) more externally, whereas those who are more conservatively
oriented tend to attribute these phenomena more internally. In their own research,
Skitka et al. (2002) showed that, in their automatically generated judgments
(generated under high cognitive load), both liberally and conservatively oriented
participants tended to refuse payment for medical treatment of a disease if the
patient her or himself is to be blamed for it. However, the liberally oriented
participants seem to show a higher motivation to correct this decision than
conservatives. When the additional cognitive load is absent the liberals are
significantly more willing to grant payment for medical treatment. But individual
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attitudes are not the only sources of differences in motivation to elaborate initial
judgments. Specific situations may also induce such motivation. According to
Tetlock (1989, 2002) people are much more likely to apply correcting strategies
spontaneously if they expect real consequences, or if they know that they may be
held responsible for their judgments on punishment. Thus, if subjects are
accountable for their judgment, they might be especially motivated to correct their
decision in such a way as to produce a closer correspondence to their moral values
(see also Tetlock et al., 2007). Gilbert (1995) was also able to demonstrate that
subjects do correct a fundamental attribution error, i.e., they more extensively take
into account external influences upon behavior and they are less inclined to infer
from observed behavior to basic dispositions, if they have the capacity to act on
deliberative motivation. Finally, Lieberman (2002) showed that subjects who had to
take the role of jurors in an action for compensation did not show more leniency as a
function of the extralegal variable ‘‘attractiveness of the defendant’’ if they were
reminded about applying a rational mode of information processing.
The empirical findings on the correction of judgment biases are not uniformly
encouraging, however, since suppression of thoughts (Payne, 2005) as well as
subsequent correction of biases (Fleming, Wegener, & Petty, 1999; Wegener &
Petty, 1997; Wegener, Kerr, Fleming, & Petty, 2000) may ironically lead to
undesired results. Thus, self-awareness, ethical standards, and social pressure may
well motivate people to correct possible judgmental biases. In addition to a
motivation to elaborate one’s own judgments, for a successful correction of biases it
seems to be necessary that persons do have knowledge of the fact that their
judgment has been influenced by extralegal variables (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, &
Jarvis, 1996). However, individuals may not always have a clear idea or picture of
what has caused their judgment, and they have to rely on their naive theories to
determine the direction and magnitude of any potential bias (Bargh, 1999; Nisbett &
Wilson, 1977). Thus, unless perceivers are skillful enough to identify precisely the
kind and magnitude of any bias, it may happen that they are mistaken, and correct
for the wrong bias on the wrong dimension, or undercorrect or even overcorrect
their initial decision (Wegener & Petty, 1995, 1997). Hence, it is not surprising if
the simple instruction in court that lay judges should judge in a fashion as fair and
unbiased as possible is very often not sufficient to ensure avoidance of judgmental
biases (Lieberman & Sales, 1997; Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984; Steblay, Hosch,
Culhane, & Mc Wethy, 2006; Tanford & Cox, 1988). Judicial judgments may be
especially problematic because there are in general not one but several sources of
judgmental biases. Here, it may happen that persons are well able to avoid a
stereotyping judgment based on the most salient cues, but they could still be
influenced by other biasing variables. Blair, Judd, and Chapleau (2004) demon-
strated, for example, that nowadays the skin color of the defendant barely influences
degree of punishment, but that raters are still liable to unconscious race
stereotyping. Racial stereotyping in sentencing is now based more on the facial
appearance of offenders. Be they White or Black, offenders who possess more
Afrocentric features (e.g., dark skin, wide nose, and full lips) receive harsher
sentences for the same crimes than offenders less Afrocentric in appearance (Blair
et al., 2004, p. 678).
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Overview of the Present Research
Two studies reported here examine how and under what conditions extralegal
variables will influence either automatically formed or more elaborated punishment
decisions. We examine whether the influence of variables, such as the victim’s
reputation, or the severity of an outcome that was unintended by the offender, are
corrected if participants are motivated to elaborate their judgment on punishment. It
is the central aim of both studies to determine whether participants will successfully
correct the biasing influence of extralegal variables when they have optimal
conditions to elaborate their judgment. Thus, we compare, on the one hand,
judgments on punishment generated under restricted cognitive capacity and, on the
other hand, judgments generated not only with sufficient cognitive capacity but also
under conditions of self-awareness and accountability.
In the first study, only one extralegal variable is manipulated. Thus, it should be
relatively easy for participants to identify the biasing influence. Even if the
unwarranted influence occurs unconsciously it should be relatively easy to access a
correct naive theory of what might possibly have had a biasing influence. It is
assumed that the extralegal variable will bias the judgment if participants have to
judge automatically because they are doing so under conditions of restricted
cognitive capacity, but that this biasing influence will be corrected if participants are
motivated to come up with a correct judgment. In the second study, the judgment is
more complicated because the combination of two extralegal variables is
manipulated. Up to now, it is an unanswered question as to whether participants
will correct any biasing influence if more biasing variables are involved, or whether
they will focus only on one of them. In cases where participants are motivated to
elaborate their judgment, it is, therefore, of additional interest whether people will
spontaneously correct only for the most obvious influences of extralegal variables,
or whether they will exhaustively scrutinize all possible biases, and correct them
accordingly.
Among extralegal variables, we manipulated first the reputation of the victim
(Study 1), and second both the reputation of the victim and the extent of injury that
was not intended by the offender but happened more or less accidentally (Study 2).
Severity of injury probably has considerable significance for an intuitively formed
moral judgment since it triggers intuitions of injustice and threat by others
(Mazzocco et al., 2004).
Study 1
In Study 1, we examined whether judgments about punishment are influenced by the
victim’s reputation. Although it is often considered morally unjustified to punish an
offender on the basis of the victim’s reputation (Mazzocco et al., 2004), we
anticipated that participants would nevertheless be influenced by the victim’s
reputation if their judgment was made automatically, under restricted cognitive
capacity (low processing depth). If automatic judgments are guided by emotional
reactions, then victims with a good rather than a poor reputation should trigger more
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empathy and a greater desire to defend or seek redress for the victim. However,
correction of an intuitive judgment was predicted when participants were motivated
to elaborate their judgment, e.g., under conditions of accountability (high processing
depth). Consequently, we contrasted judgments about punishment under conditions
of low information processing depth and conditions of high information processing
depth. We chose a crime (presented in a vignette) in which the reputation of the
victim was varied, but would be unknown to the offender.
Method
Participants
Students of psychology (N = 77) at the University of Berne participated for credits
in their introductory psychology courses. The sample consisted of 60 women (78%)
and 17 men (22%) who were between 18 and 41 years old (M = 21.97, SD = 3.63).
Scenarios
A vignette was presented to the participants in which a victim is assaulted. The
victim is on his way home from work when a young man attacks him, hitting him,
and stealing his wallet. The victim has to go to hospital with concussion and spends
the night there (see Appendix for the vignettes).
Design and Measures
The study has a 2 (victim reputation: good vs. bad) 9 2 (processing depth: low vs.
high) between-subjects factorial design. The victim’s reputation was manipulated as
follows. In the good reputation condition, the victim is a physician, described as a
decent person with basically positive attributes. In the bad reputation condition, the
victim is a small-time criminal, described as having basically negative attributes.
All other information about the offender and the offense was kept identical.
Participants listened to the case history over headphones.
Depth of processing was manipulated by means of cognitive capacity, self-
awareness, and accountability. Participants in the low processing depth condition
had to solve a dual-processing task while they listened to the case story. Those in the
deep processing condition had no dual task to solve and were additionally made
more self-aware and accountable for their judgment. They were informed that they
would have to justify their final decision about the punishment, and that their final
statement would be videotaped.
Punishment was measured with five items incorporating 7-point Likert rating
scales (Cronbach’s alpha: .80). In the first item, participants were asked about how
severely the offender should be punished for his offence (1 = not at all, 7 = very
severely). Then, they were asked to give their views of a relatively harsh
punishment (2 years imprisonment), and of a relatively lenient punishment
(4 weeks work of benefit to the public), on a 7 point rating scale (1 = much too
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lenient, 7 = much too harsh), and of their perception of the adequacy of the
respective punishments (1 = not at all adequate, 7 = completely adequate).
The perceived severity of the victim’s injury was assessed by means of a three-
item scale (Cronbach’s alpha: .69). Participants were asked about how severe they
estimated the material, the physical, and the psychological damage suffered by the
victim as a result of the offence. Quality of recall was measured by means of a
recognition test. Forty items (statements about what happened in the story) were
presented to the participants, only half of the statements being true. True statements
asked, for example, whether the offender stole a wallet, or whether the victim had to
spend a night in the hospital. False statements asked, for example, whether the
offender extorted money, whether he was married, or whether the victim had to
undergo surgery.
Procedure
Instructions to the participants were given by computer. They were all told that they
would hear a story over headphones. Participants in the low processing depth
condition pressed the left key every time the letter ‘‘K’’ or a red letter appeared on
the screen, and pressed the right key if any other letter appeared. Letters remained
on the screen for 1.5 s. Participants in the high processing depth condition listened
undisturbed to the story and were additionally instructed that they would have to
account for their judgments about the offence, and that their arguments would be
recorded on a videotape, and would be analyzed later on by experts. After the
participants had heard the story, they completed a questionnaire on the computer.
Finally, they performed the recognition test on the computer. Statements about the
story appeared on the screen, and they had to decide as quickly as possible whether
the statements described something mentioned in the story, or not.
Results
The manipulation of processing depth was successful. The number of correctly
identified items in the recognition test was lower in the dual-task condition
(M = 31.76, SD = 3.20) than the accountability condition (M = 35.85, SD = 2.58),
as indicated by a significant main effect of processing depth, F [1, 75] = 42.21,
p \ .001, g2 = .36. This effect was moderated neither by the gender of participants
F [1, 73] = .34, p = .56, g2 = .01, nor by the victim’s reputation F [1, 72] = .358,
p = .55, g2 = .01. Additionally, we were able to verify the success of this
manipulation by comparing reaction times for responses to the questions assessing
the dependent variables; these also differed significantly (Mlow processing depth =
10.90 s.; Mhigh processing depth = 13.70 s.), F [1, 75] = 6.09, p \ .05, g
2 = .08.
Again, this effect was not moderated by the gender of participants or victim
reputation.
Table 1 displays means and standard deviations of punishment in the different
conditions.
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Recommended punishment was more severe in the dual-task condition than in the
accountability condition, as indicated by a significant main effect of processing
depth, F [1, 73] = 4.07, p \ .05, g2 = .05. Additionally, as shown in Fig. 1, there
was a significant interaction between victim reputation and processing depth, F [1,
73] = 8.30, p \ .01, g2 = .10. The punishment recommended for the ‘‘good’’
victim was harsher in the low-depth condition than the high-depth condition F [1,
36] = 13.32, p \ .01, g2 = .27, whereas recommended punishment did not differ
significantly for the ‘‘bad’’ victim F [1, 37] = 3.71, p \ .55, g2 = .01. Under
conditions of low processing depth, harsher punishments were recommended in case
of the ‘‘good’’ victim than of the ‘‘bad’’ victim, F [1, 36] = 4.02, p \ .05, g2 = .07,
but under conditions of high processing depth harsher punishments were recom-
mended in case of the ‘‘bad’’ victim than of the ‘‘good’’ victim, F [1, 36] = 6.88,
p \ .05, g2 = .15.
Perceived injury to the physician (M = 5.05; SD = 1.01), and to the small-time
criminal (M = 4.72; SD = 1.05) did not differ significantly. Thus, the reputation of
the victim did not affect perceived injury, F [1, 73] = 2.01, p = .15. Interestingly,
the injury perceived to be suffered by the victim was significantly more severe in the
dual-task condition (M = 4.86; SD = .94) than in the accountability condition
(M = 4.11; SD = .93), F [1, 73] = 4.37, p \ .001, g2 = .14. This influence was
not moderated by the gender of the participants nor by the victim’s reputation.
Table 1 Mean judgments of punishment as a function of the reputation of the victim and processing
depth
Victim’s reputation Low processing depth High processing depth
Mean SD n Mean SD n
Good 5.02 .77 18 3.98 .97 20
Bad 4.57 1.07 19 4.75 .89 20
Note: Scores range from 1 to 7
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Fig. 1 Mean punishment for an offender as function of victim’s reputation and depth of information
processing
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Discussion
In this study, we found that only under conditions of low processing depth (dual-
task condition) would participants recommend harsher punishment if the victim had
a good rather than a bad reputation. If subjects experienced no additional cognitive
load, and if they expected they would have to justify their judgment in front of a
video camera, their punishment decisions were actually even more lenient if the
victim had a good rather than a bad reputation. Thus, we can conclude that people
automatically prefer harsher punishment for an offender if the victim has a good
rather than a bad reputation, but that this preference can be changed if an
opportunity to elaborate the judgment is provided. But, in the latter case it is not
easy to explain why the condition enabling higher depth of processing did not really
have a de-biasing effect. What we actually found was a reverse influence rather than
the disappearance of any influence of the extralegal factor victim reputation.
Interestingly, the punishment was not harsher for an offender who had attacked a
small-time criminal but was more lenient for an offender who had attacked a
physician. Thus, participants in the high depth of processing condition seemed to be
more concerned about punishing too harshly than about punishing too leniently. But
why then do participants recommend even more lenient punishment if the victim
had a good rather than a bad reputation? According to Wegener and Petty (1995,
1997) participants probably realized the nature of the likely bias in their judgment
but had difficulties calibrating its magnitude, leading them to overcorrect their
initial decision.
Furthermore, we found that level of processing depth influenced the punishment
recommended. Participants preferred harsher punishments under restricted (dual
task) cognitive capacity conditions than under conditions of high-depth process-
ing. One reason for the effect of processing depth on recommended punishment
might be that the injury suffered by the victim was perceived to be less serious
under greater processing depth conditions than with lesser depth of processing.
The perceived severity of the assault was, however, not influenced by the
reputation of the victim.
Study 2
It was the aim of this second study to gain somewhat more insight into the ability of
people to correct judgmental biases if they are motivated to come up with an
unbiased judgment. In this study, we increased the difficulty of the task by
manipulating not just one extralegal variable but the combined influence of two of
them. In this case, it should be more difficult for participants to have exact
knowledge about the biasing influence, and we wondered whether the motivation to
elaborate their judgment would be sufficient to correct the influence of both
extralegal variables. We manipulated the victim’s reputation but also outcome
severity that occurred unintended by the offender, and examined their effects on
judgments of punishment under different processing depth conditions.
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Method
Participants
Students of psychology at the University of Berne participated for credits in their
introductory psychology courses. The sample consisted of 106 women (73.6%) and
38 men (26.4%) who were between 18 and 48 years old (M = 22.42; SD = 4.60).
Scenario
A similar vignette to that used in Study 1 was presented to the participants: the
victim is again on his way home from work when a young man attacks him, hitting
him and stealing his wallet. As in Study 1 section, the victim has to go to hospital
with concussion and spend the night there. Additionally, this time the victim goes to
the toilet (during the night in the hospital), stumbles and falls down with
consequences that vary in severity across conditions (see Appendix for the
vignettes).
Design and Measures
The Study has a 2 (outcome severity: low vs. high) 9 2 (processing depth: low vs.
high) 9 2 (victim reputation: good vs. bad) between-subjects factorial design. The
severity of the outcome that was unintended by the offender varied in terms of the
consequences of the victim’s fall in the hospital: either the victim was unhurt, or
broke a leg and had to endure a complicated operation because of the fracture. Thus,
the manipulated severity of the outcome was absolutely accidental and had nothing
to do with the offender’s attack. As in Study 1, processing depth was varied by
cognitive capacity, self-awareness, and the motivation to make a just decision. The
victim’s reputation was varied in a manner analogous to Study 1. In one condition,
the victim is a physician, and in the other a small-time criminal. All other
information about the offender and the offense was identical across conditions.
Punishment was again measured with a five-item rating scale (Cronbach’s alpha:
.75). Additionally, we assessed the probability attributed by subjects to different
possible outcomes of the offense (fall without harm, and fall with fracture of the leg)
on a 7-point Likert scale. The perceived harm to the victim (Cronbach’s alpha: .62)
as well as the accuracy of memory were measured identically to Study 1. However,
the memory test included four additional statements to capture in particular the new
content of the scenarios describing the variations in outcome severity. The whole
procedure of the Study remained entirely the same as in Study 1.
Results
The manipulation of unintended outcome severity was successful. The injury was
judged to be significantly more severe if the fall resulted in a broken leg (M = 5.00;
SD = .76) than if it did not (M = 4.42; SD = .68), F [1, 143] = 23.02, p \ .001,
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g2 = .14. This effect was moderated neither by gender of participants nor by victim
reputation. The effect of processing depth was verified on the basis of correctly
identified items in the recognition test; the scores differed significantly between the
levels of processing, F [1, 144] = 33.70, p \ .001, g2 = .19. Out of a total of 44
items, participants responded correctly on average to 35.91 items (SD = 3.77) in the
dual-task condition, and to 39.09 items (SD = 2.80) in the accountability condition.
This effect was moderated neither by participants’ gender, nor by victim’s
reputation, but was moderated by outcome severity. However, after excluding the
four recognition items that refer to the different outcomes of the victim’s fall in the
hospital, the influence of outcome severity on the recognition test disappeared, F [1,
143] = .311, p = .58), while the effect of processing depth remained significant, F
[1, 143] = 75.19, p \ .001, g2 = .34. Thus, outcome severity does not influence
recognition in general. Only statements about the victim’s broken leg were more
accurately recalled in the high severity condition than were the items about the
victim’s fall that had no consequences in the low severity condition. Additionally,
we found that participants perceived the high and low severity outcomes as equally
probable. Thus, we can exclude the possibility that punishment recommendations
are influenced by any tendency for participants to attribute different probabilities of
occurrence to low versus high outcome severity.
Table 2 displays means and standard deviations for punishment.
There was no three-way interaction. Recommended punishment was harsher in
the ‘‘good’’ victim condition (M = 4.31, SD = .83) than in the ‘‘bad’’ victim
condition (M = 3.95, SD = .89), as indicated by a significant main effect of victim
reputation, F [1, 137] = 6.81, p \ .05, g2 = .05. Although we could not replicate
the interaction between victim’s reputation and processing depth found in Study 1,
an additional analysis of contrasts did show that the main effect of victim reputation
is mainly associated with low processing depth. In the low-depth condition, the
punishment recommended for the offender who assaulted a ‘‘good’’ victim was
harsher (M = 4.32; SD = .82) than for the offender who assaulted a ‘‘bad’’ victim
(M = 3.84; SD = .65), as indicated by a significant main effect, F [1, 68] = 6.02,
p \ .05, g2 = .08, but in the high-depth condition the recommended punishment did
not differ significantly as between offenders who had assaulted either a ‘‘good’’
victim (M = 4.30; SD = .84) or a ‘‘bad’’ victim (M = 4.05; SD = 1.07). Thus, in
the high-depth condition participants seemed to avoid the biasing influence of victim
Table 2 Mean judgments of punishment as a function of unintended outcome severity, processing depth,
and reputation of the victim
Victim’s reputation Outcome severity Low processing depth High processing depth
Mean SD n Mean SD n
Good High 4.49 .91 17 4.12 .91 19
Low 4.12 .71 20 4.52 .76 20
Bad High 4.14 .38 17 4.19 1.13 17
Low 3.55 .74 16 3.90 1.03 19
Note: Scores range from 1 to 7
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reputation more than in the low-depth condition. But this time the correction was
more modest, and we could not find a tendency to overcorrect the bias, as we did in
Study 1. Furthermore, we found a marginally significant interaction between
outcome severity and processing depth (F [1, 137] = 3.62, p = .059, g2 = .03). In
the low-depth condition, the suggested punishment was harsher if the victim
suffered more harm because of his fall in the hospital, F [1, 69] = 6.88, p \ .05,
g2 = .09, whereas in the high-depth condition the participants recommended the
same punishment, independent of whether the victim suffered more or less severely
as a consequence of his fall in the hospital. However, this convergence in
recommended punishment occurred not only because participants reduced their
punishment in the high severity condition, but also because they increased their
recommended punishment in the low severity condition.
Taken as a whole, results of Study 2 show that the influence of the victim’s
reputation as well as that of unintended outcome severity biased the judgment in the
low-depth condition as expected, and that this influence is largely absent in the high-
depth condition. Whether the recommended punishment in the high-depth condition
is still biased or not seems to be a separate question, however. The results displayed
in Fig. 2 are combined across the levels of victim’s reputation.
Discussion
In Study 2, we manipulated not only the reputation of the victim, as in Study 1, but
also the outcome severity of the offense, to make the judgment more complex. The
manipulation of outcome severity was devised to exclude direct responsibility on the
part of the offender. The victim, who had been assaulted by the offender, suffered
additionally, or not, as a result of a fall in hospital (a broken leg vs. no consequences).
Thus, we manipulated two extralegal factors such that a punishment recommenda-
tion should depend neither on the specific reputation of the victim nor on the degree
of injury to the victim that could not be controlled by the offender. The results show
that generally harsher punishment was recommended if the offender’s victim had a
good rather than a bad reputation. However, we did not find, as in Study 1, any
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Fig. 2 Mean punishment recommended for an offender as a function of unintended outcome severity and
depth of information processing
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significant interaction between victim’s reputation and processing depth, although an
additional analysis of contrasts did show that the main effect of the victim’s
reputation was mainly associated with low-depth processing. On the other hand, both
studies show that under conditions of higher information processing depth
participants do not punish an offender significantly more harshly simply because
he had assaulted a victim with a good rather than with a bad reputation. But in Study
1, avoidance of such a bias actually resulted in an overcorrection, while no such
overcorrection could be found in Study 2. Furthermore, we were able to corroborate a
marginally significant interaction between outcome severity and processing depth in
Study 2. In the low-depth condition, we found some proof of an extralegal severity
effect, because the offender was punished more harshly if the victim had additionally
suffered because of a broken leg than if there was no additional injury. Under
conditions of higher processing depth, however, the different outcome severities
attracted almost equivalent punishment recommendations. Interestingly, the con-
vergence of punishment in the high depth as compared to the low-depth condition
does not result entirely from more lenient punishment recommendations. When
participants have the opportunity to elaborate their judgment, they recommend
greater leniency in the case of a significant but unintended injury to the victim, but
also greater severity, if the victim’s fall results in no further injury.
The increase in punishment in the high-depth condition with a low severity
outcome is not easily explained since elaboration of the judgment should clarify that
the victim’s fall in the hospital was not intended by the offender, and thus should not
influence the punishment at all. However, it is possible that the elaboration also
leads the participants to think about what could have happened to the victim as a
result of his fall, even though it had no consequences in this case. Study 2 also
shows that participants do take care to make certain corrections of their automatic
judgments, but that these corrections do not entirely comply with the normative
rules for the avoidance of judgmental biases.
General Discussion
Considering the results of both studies, they clearly confirm that judgments about
punishment differ considerably between conditions of low (restricted cognitive
capacity) and high processing depth (accountability and self-awareness). Both
studies successfully replicated previous findings that harsher punishment will be
advocated for an offender if his victim has a good rather than a poor reputation. This
is, however, primarily true under conditions of limited processing depth. If people
are motivated to elaborate their punishment recommendations (high processing
depth condition) they are, in principle, willing to correct their automatic judgment.
The nature and magnitude of the correction of the extralegal influence of victim
reputation under conditions of greater information processing, however, is not
necessarily successful. In Study 1, the bias was overcorrected such that even harsher
punishment was recommended if the offender had assaulted a petty criminal (poor
reputation), and not an honorable physician (good reputation). But in Study 2, the
influence of reputation was merely reduced as indicated by the main effect of
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victim’s reputation that was mainly associated with the low-depth condition.
Nevertheless, in Study 2 the effect of the interaction between victim reputation and
processing depth on recommended punishment was not significant, in contrast to
Study 1. How can we explain the different degrees of correction of the influence of
reputation across the two studies? One possible explanation could be that in Study 2
it was not only victim reputation that was manipulated as an extralegal variable but
also injury to the victim that was unintended by the offender (outcome severity).
Therefore, it may be that in Study 2 participants’ efforts to correct their judgments
were divided between the two extralegal variables. The marginally significant
interaction between processing depth and outcome severity seems consistent with
this possibility. With respect to outcome severity, we found that participants in the
low-depth condition proposed harsher punishment the more severe, albeit
unintended, the outcome of his offense was (severity effect), but that in the high-
depth condition this effect was attenuated. Thus, participants tried to avoid the
biasing influence of both extralegal variables, namely unintended outcome severity
and reputation. However, correction of the severity effect was again not what one
should expect if normative standards were being respected. Since the victim’s fall in
the hospital was neither intended by nor under the control of the offender, it should
not significantly influence the recommended punishment one way or the other. But
what we found was that the correction was not purely due to a more lenient
punishment in the high-depth condition. While a decrease in punishment was
observed in the high outcome severity condition, the recommended punishment in
the low outcome severity condition was now even harsher in the high-depth
processing condition than in the low-depth processing condition. One can only
speculate why participants in the high-depth condition increased their punishment
when the victim had no additional suffering to bear. They might have thought about
what else could have happened to the victim and these conditional scenarios might
have aggravated their recommended punishment.
In summary, participants can be motivated to correct biasing influences on their
judgment. However, these corrections seem to be quite limited. They either go too
far, or not far enough, and are partly even erroneous. Although it is quite easy for
people to become aware of the fact that an offender should neither be punished too
severely because the victim happened to be an honorable physician, nor too leniently
because the victim happened to be a small-time criminal, as in Study 1 where only
the victim’s reputation was manipulated, they nonetheless lack a frame of reference
for the appropriate amount of punishment to be meted out (cf. Wegener & Petty,
1995, 1997). In this case, their correction of the initial inclination may go beyond the
target, as the overcorrections indicate. If the detection of biasing influences becomes
more complex, as in Study 2, where two biasing influences were manipulated,
participants correct insufficiently for each of the two variables, and to some extent
not in the right direction. They may either focus only on the most salient influence
and conclude their critical reasoning process as soon as one correction is
accomplished, or they may mistakenly correct on the wrong dimension, as when
recommending harsher punishment when the unintended outcome severity was low.
Taken together, cognitive capacity to act on accountability does not always de-bias
judgments or elicit fairer judgments as e.g. Tetlock et al. (2007) assume.
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Further studies on de-biasing conditions of punishment decisions are important,
and in the interests of greater ecological validity should continue the approach of
expanding on the number of biasing influences from just one to more extralegal
variables. They should also, however, focus more on the meta-cognitions of the
participants, in order to uncover what they are thinking while elaborating their
judgments. If judgments about appropriate punishment are to be improved, it is
important to determine whether participants are aware of extralegal factors at all,
and why they are correcting their judgments in one and not another direction.
Additionally, although it was the central aim of both studies to discover whether
people are able to successfully correct for the influence of extralegal variables under
optimal conditions, future studies should differentiate more between effects of an
elaboration that are either due to sufficient cognitive capacity, to self-awareness, or
to accountability.
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Appendix: Vignettes
Vignettes in Study 1:
Condition 1: ‘‘good’’ Victim
Thomas R is a heart surgeon. He works in a large university hospital and conducts
several complicated operations every day. He is married and has three children. In
his free time he likes to hike with his family, and is member of the Swiss Alps Club.
He lives in a nice house at the periphery. His neighbors describe him as a person
who works a lot. They say he is not a great talker but always helpful. The evening of
September 22nd, he has had a busy day during which he had to conduct two
operations and to attend several emergencies. So he is quite tired when he goes
home, and looks forward to going to the cinema with his family.
As usual, he walks from the bus stop to his house, and he is glad that the sun is
shining this day. Shortly before arriving at his house, he is suddenly attacked by a
young man. The man knocks him down and steals him his wallet. The offender
flees. Thomas R. remains lying injured on the floor until some passers-by help him.
He has to go to the hospital with a concussion and some bruises, and has to spend
the night there. A little later the offender is caught because of the descriptions of the
passers-by. He is a 25 year old Swiss who confesses the offence shortly after his
detention. He says that he wanted to make money quickly and that he chose his
victim at random.
Condition 2 ‘‘bad’’ Victim
Lukas K is a small-time criminal who earns his living by means of frauds. His
favored method is to sell insurances which don’t exist. To do so, he
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impersonates an insurance agent and promises his victims cheap insurances. The
premiums and advance payments end up in his private account. His victims are
mostly older ladies who live in modest financial circumstances. They lose all
their savings because of the fraud. Lukas lives in a nice house at the periphery.
His neighbors describe him as communicative but not very cooperative when
help is needed. He has a son with his ex-girlfriend but doesn’t care much about
him. On the evening of September 22nd, he is once again on his way home from
a successful fraud.
As always he walks from the bus stop to his house and he is glad that the sun is
shining this day. Shortly before arriving at his house he is suddenly attacked by a
young man. The man knocks him down and steals him his wallet. The offender
flees. Lukas K. remains lying injured on the floor until some passers-by help him.
He has to go to the hospital with a concussion and some bruises and has to spend the
night there. A little later, the offender is caught because of the descriptions of the
passers-by. He is a 25 year old Swiss who confesses the offence shortly after his
detention. He says that he wanted to make money quickly and that he chose his
victim at random.
Vignettes in Study 2:
Condition 1: High Outcome Severity (Good Victim)
Thomas R is a heart surgeon. He works in a large university hospital and
conducts several complicated operations every day. He is married and has three
children. In his free time he likes to hike with his family, and is member of the
Swiss Alps Club. He lives in a nice house at the periphery. His neighbors
describe him as a person who works a lot. They say he is not a great talker but
always helpful. The evening of September 22nd, he has had a busy day during
which he had to conduct two operations and to attend several emergencies. So
he is quite tired when he goes home, and looks forward to going to the cinema
with his family.
As usual, he walks from the bus stop to his house, and he is glad that the sun is
shining this day. Shortly before arriving at his house, he is suddenly attacked by a
young man. The man knocks him down and steals him his wallet. The offender
flees. Thomas R remains lying injured on the floor until some passers-by help him.
He has to go to the hospital with a concussion and some bruises, and has to spend
the night there. During the night Thomas R. wakes up because he has to go urgently
to the toilet. Because he is still quite dizzy as a consequence of the concussion, he
stumbles and falls on the hard floor. He falls so badly that he gets a complicated
fracture on his left thigh bone. He will be handicapped for several weeks and has to
undergo a surgery. A few days later, the offender is caught because of the
descriptions of the passers-by. He is a 25 year old Swiss who confesses the offence
shortly after his detention. He says that he wanted to make money quickly and that
he chose his victim at random.
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Condition 2: Low Outcome Severity (Good Victim)
Thomas R is a heart surgeon. He works in a large university hospital and conducts
several complicated operations every day. He is married and has three children. In
his free time he likes to hike with his family, and is member of the Swiss Alps Club.
He lives in a nice house at the periphery. His neighbors describe him as a person
who works a lot. They say he is not a great talker but always helpful. The evening of
September 22nd, he has had a busy day during which he had to conduct two
operations and to attend several emergencies. So he is quite tired when he goes
home and looks forward to going to the cinema with his family.
As usual, he walks from the bus stop to his house, and he is glad that the sun is
shining this day. Shortly before arriving at his house, he is suddenly attacked by a
young man. The man knocks him down and steals him his wallet. The offender
flees. Thomas R remains lying injured on the floor until some passers-by help him.
He has to go to the hospital with a concussion and some bruises, and has to spend
the night there. During the night Thomas R wakes up because he has to go urgently
to the toilet. Because he is still quite dizzy in consequence of the concussion, he
stumbles and falls on the hard floor. Fortunately the fall has no further consequences
for him. A few days later, the offender is caught because of the descriptions of the
passers-by. He is a 25 year old Swiss who confesses the offence shortly after his
detention. He says that he wanted to make money quickly and that he chose his
victim at random.
Conditions 3 and 4: High and Low Outcome Severity (Bad Victim)
The same manipulations of high and low outcome severity were made for the
vignettes with the small-time criminal (compare vignettes of Study 1).
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